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Abstract: Punctuated Equilibria: Three ‘Leaps’ in the Evolution of the German 
Vocational Training System. Germany’s vocational training system evolved 
into its modern form in the four decades between 1897 and 1937. This evo-
lution did not occur smoothly, but in three bursts of activity, each under a 
different political regime. After the 1897 Handwerk Law established a partial 
model for overcoming incentives problems associated with training skilled 
workers, between 1907 and 1912 the German state organized a ‘coalition of 
the willing’ among German engineering and machine-tool firms in order to 
extend the same model to parts of industry. In the mid-1920s, the major Ger-
man industrial groups took the initiative to standardize vocational profiles 
and training schemes. Finally, in the mid-1930s German industry and key 
national ministries cooperated to give standardized certifications for indus-
trial vocations legal standing on par with those in handicrafts. As a result, 
hundreds of thousands of young Germans began entering apprenticeships 
for skilled work.
Key Words: Vocational training, industry, handicrafts, Kaiserreich, Weimar, 
Nazism
Introduction
In the late 1930s the German system of industrial vocational training assumed its 
modern form. A 1938 decree of the Ministry of Education put industrial appren-
ticeships on the same legal footing as those in handicrafts. With this step the Nazi 
state gave its sanction to efforts industry was already undertaking to create hund-
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reds of nationally standardized industrial Berufe. After a three- or four-year training, 
combining an apprenticeship and study in a vocational school,2 each young worker 
would earn a Lehrbrief, a certificate of his training. And thanks to ‘a great coope-
rative endeavor’ started a few years earlier by industry, the Ministry of Economics, 
and the Labor Administration, hundreds of thousands of young Germans were now 
entering industrial apprenticeships each year. By 1939, German industry was offe-
ring more training positions to young (male) Germans than there were (male) stu-
dents leaving school. Certification and standardization together produced a mobile 
high-skills workforce. This vast expansion of skilled positions promised to lift Ger-
man workers out of the proletariat into the middle class: whatever the regime’s inten-
tions, this amounted to a de facto Nazi program of upward mobility.
Even if these capstones were placed on the German vocational system during the 
Third Reich, the Nazis were hardly the sole, or even particularly important, proge-
nitors of the system. Rather, a partial blueprint had been sketched forty years and 
two regimes earlier, in the 1897 Handwerk Law. Over the ensuing four decades, this 
basic model was extended to apply uniformly throughout the country and to include 
industry, not just handicrafts. These crucial expansions did not follow a smooth, 
linear path, however. Instead, they occurred in three bursts of intense reform, one in 
the last peacetime years of the Kaiserreich, one during the relatively stable, middle 
years of the Weimar Republic, and the final one, as sketched above, during the ante-
bellum Third Reich. If the basic model was available as early as the turn of the cen-
tury why did it take 40 years to implement fully? And why did the extension to 
industry occur how and when it did, in concentrated bursts  – or, to borrow the 
language of evolutionary biology, ‘punctuations’3 – between 1907–12, 1925–29, and 
1934–39?
The ‘Apprenticeship Crisis’ and the Progressive 1897 Handwerk Law
To answer these questions we must first briefly sketch the state of vocational trai-
ning in the late 19th century, above all the fundamental problem it faced, as well as 
the blueprint of a solution contained in the 1897 Handwerk Law. During the first 
decades of the Kaiserreich, when the new country’s institutions were still proving 
themselves, so much seemed in flux, and national self-assurance mixed with anxi-
ety. Youth was a focus of particular concern.4 Without proper guidance, school-lea-
vers might fall into bad moral habits or, even worse, under the sway of the burge-
oning Social Democratic movement. Even more troubling to the authorities than 
these political risks, were the economic dangers, as recent research has emphasized.5 
Without a well-trained workforce, German firms – Germany itself – risked falling 
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behind increasingly dynamic foreign challengers, not just in Europe but in the Japan 
and the United States. 
The worries were most acute in handicrafts, where the talk since the 1870s 
had been of an ‘apprenticeship crisis.’ Recent work in the fields of New Institutio-
nal Economics6 (NIE) and Varieties of Capitalism7 (VOC) illuminates the causes of 
the crisis, suggesting that at its root was an incentives problem. The North German 
Confederation’s liberal industrial code of 1869, which the German Empire adopted 
in 1871, had finally abolished the last remaining guilds. These, while already in dec-
line, had nonetheless still regulated apprenticeships and overseen certification of 
masters, however inadequately. In the absence of any authority to retain their app-
rentices at the end of their training period, masters were now even more likely than 
before to exploit their charges as cheap labor. With ever greater frequency, apprenti-
ces, seeing few prospects in being trained and tempted by the initially higher wages 
and less onerous supervision in large industry, broke their contracts early. Conse-
quently, industrial employers had little way of judging the skills of those they hired 
away from Handwerk. As NIE and VOC suggest, the incentive problems handicap-
ping German vocational training in the first decades of the Kaiserreich were prob-
lems of any liberalized labor market.8
The solution came in 1897, in the form of a revision to the industrial code gover-
ning handicrafts. Contrary to earlier scholarship, which regarded the Kaiserreich’s 
handicrafts policy and in particular the Handwerk Law as a politically motivated 
attempt to shore up the backward-looking, defensive strata of craftsmen,9 Hal Han-
sen has convincingly demonstrated that economic, market-friendly motives shaped 
the Law’s final form.10 Most importantly, the Law reestablished at the regional level 
a modified, modernized form of handicraft guild less than three decades after it had 
been abolished. For the older scholarship, this move away from a purely liberal eco-
nomic order could only have had (conservative) political motives. And some figu-
res in the Reich and Prussian governments did intend the Law to work in this direc-
tion. New Institutional Economics and Varieties of Capitalism approaches, however, 
attuned to the informational and incentives problems of any economic order, put the 
1897 bill in a completely different light. Drawing on models in the southwest Ger-
man states of Baden and Württemberg, the reestablished, modernized guilds could 
establish standards for training, supervise apprenticeships and new apprenticeship 
contracts, and certify the results of qualifying exams. The legislation was meant not 
to protect Handwerk from competition, but rather to give artisans a chance of suc-
ceeding in the market. The system of standardized certification gave youths and 
handicraft masters the incentive to engage in vocational training. For the former, 
the certificates were portable, and hence valuable, attestations of the skills they had 
acquired. For the masters, the certificate system, coupled with new apprenticeship 
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contracts, meant that they could count on their apprentices not running away and 
that, even if they could not retain them after their exams, any journeymen they hired 
from outside would have a similar level of training. The only apparently illiberal 
restoration of guilds thus provided a means of partly overcoming the disincentives 
to train and be trained inherent in a completely liberalized labor market. The reesta-
blishment of modernized guilds belonged, at least in part, to a liberal economic stra-
tegy on the part of a German state intent on creating a high-skills workforce.
Yet if this model of collectively certifying training provided a blueprint for the 
future of the entire German vocational system, its realization in 1897 was only a 
partial success. This Law established a patchwork of regional guilds but no natio-
nal framework for agreeing on and enforcing collective training standards. Over 
the subsequent years, the restored bodies made efforts to forge ever-broader asso-
ciations, but this was slow going. A much more significant limitation of the 1897 
reforms, however, was the fact that they applied only to handicrafts and not to indus-
try. As a result, the main employer of skilled labor and the trainer, by 1907, of fully 
one-third of all skilled workers11 played no role in collectively setting and certifying 
skill levels. This was partly due to the mistrust between handicrafts and industry,12 
and partly to industry’s ambivalence about the future role of the skilled worker (see 
below). These limitations, however, should not obscure the 1897 legislation’s real 
successes. In the short term, it began to alleviate the ‘apprenticeship crisis’ in Hand-
werk. In the long term, the 1897 legislation’s certification procedures would pro-
vide a model for a general solution to the incentives problem of creating a mobile 
high-skills workforce, one that would be complemented by steps industry took in 
the 1920s, and then fully implemented throughout the German economy starting 
in the late 1930s. 
The First Punctuation, 1907–12: The Prussian Trade Ministry and 
Industrial Self-Organizing
Given the growing importance of industry for Germany’s economy, the failure to 
include industry in the legislation loomed as a potentially serious problem in the 
future. Before the mid-1920s, however, it was not industry that most assiduously 
pushed for a national policy on creating a well-trained industrial workforce, but gov-
ernment authorities, in particular the Prussian Trade Ministry. In the period 1907–
12, the Prussian ministry sparked the earliest concerted action by industry – or at 
least some in industry. To understand this initial burst of activity, we must first look 
at the concerns of government authorities surrounding youth and worker training 
and then at those of industry. By the second half of the decade, pressure was gro-
16 ÖZG 24 | 2013 | 1
wing for more decisive steps in Prussia’s policy toward young workers. The com-
prehensive occupational survey of 1907 produced sobering results for those, such 
as the leaders of the Prussian Trade Ministry, who wanted to expand Germany’s 
skilled workforce. The first such survey since 1895, it revealed the dramatic changes 
Germany’s rapid industrialization was causing in the workforce, especially the rising 
numbers of unskilled and female workers.13 The percentage of skilled Facharbeiter 
had declined from 65 to 58 percent.14 At the same time, the highest levels of Prussian 
government were taking a greater interest in the political implications of the ‘youth 
question’. Alarmed by the SPD’s increasing inroads among the young but rejecting 
repressive measures, Prussian Minister President Bülow and Interior Minister Beth-
man Hollweg called on their cabinet colleagues in late 1907 to develop a ‘positive’ 
youth cultivation policy.15
How precisely to achieve this general aim became the object of bitter debate 
within the Prussian government over the following three years. On the one side, con-
servatives in the Culture, Interior, and War Ministries wanted to imbue the young 
with patriotism and religious values, inoculating them against the allures of socia-
lism. To this end, they proposed making mandatory Continuation Schools (Fortbil-
dungsschulen), which gave 14- to 16-year-olds vocational training, and shifting their 
focus from practical training to political and moral indoctrination. Opposing this 
group were the Ministers of Trade and Agriculture. While they agreed that socialism 
must be combated, they insisted that the best way to do so was indirectly, by giving 
young people a stake in society. The schools’ emphasis should be on “education for 
proficiency, for pleasure in productive work, and for sympathy for the importance 
of our (…) polity, the traditions and institutions of which give every citizen a secure 
existence and the opportunity freely to exercise his creative abilities.”16
The values learned by training for skilled work – “industry, care, conscientious-
ness, perseverance, attention to detail, honesty, patience, self-discipline, devotion to 
a clear goal standing outside ourselves” – would also constitute a form, indeed the 
best one, of “citizenship education,” the trade minister argued. By encouraging indi-
vidual economic development, one would strengthen social stability. Moreover, eco-
nomic success per se, and not political education, was the most important purpose 
of these schools. “[O]ur commerce, our artisanate, and our industry” all depended 
on the practical training the continuation schools provided.
This clash within the Prussian government prompted the Trade Ministry to 
become even more active in advancing its own vision of political order and econo-
mic progress. Partly in response to the conservatives’ charge that the Continuation 
Schools were not reaching enough young people, the Trade Ministry in 1907 propo-
sed a bill compelling all municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants to estab-
lish compulsory institutions.
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Although disagreement over conservatives’ demands that these schools include 
more religious instruction ultimately scuttled the bill in 1911, the Trade Ministry 
continued with its piecemeal efforts to extend vocational schooling.17 It also played 
a catalytic role in industry’s first steps to organize its own vocational training, as we 
will see below.
The Trade Ministry’s success in keeping the number of unskilled workers as low 
as possible and creating a broad class of skilled workers depended on the coope-
ration (or at least tolerance) of important social actors, including the unions and 
industry. The unions, especially the socialist Freie Gewerkschaften, with their eye on 
political matters such as strike laws and collective bargaining arrangements, tended 
to overlook vocational training until the Weimar period.18 Above all, if Germany’s 
rapidly growing industry did not commit itself to the skilled Facharbeiter, no amount 
of public support would matter in the end. In the decades before the outbreak of the 
Great War, however, considerable ambivalence about its future production methods 
and kind of workforce characterized German industry.
Rapidly evolving labor demographics, mounting domestic political and interna-
tional economic challenges, and – crucially – the availability of alternative models 
of industrial production undercut consensus. In regard to their workforce and pro-
duction methods, German industrialists were, to use Charles Sabel’s and Jonathan 
Zeitlin’s distinction,19 not merely maximizing, but also strategizing actors – they did 
not simply accept the institutional environment as it was, but tried to shape it as well.
Even more than in Handwerk, the incentives problem inhibited worker training 
in industry. In handicrafts, at least firms could integrate instruction and production 
to a far greater extent than could industry, and the firms’ small size and still relatively 
intimate setting allowed the masters to bind at least a minimum number of appren-
tices to them, reining in somewhat the poaching problem.
In the 1890s industrial firms began paying more attention to the worker ques-
tion, though their views were anything but uniform. The growing gulf between han-
dicraft production methods and those used in industry, with its greater reliance on 
expensive machinery, made it more challenging to rely on recruiting skilled wor-
kers from handicrafts. The often explosive growth of new industries and firms – Sie-
mens’ workforce alone increased by 400 percent in the decade after 189520 – raised 
questions about how the new workers were to be integrated into increasingly mas-
sive production facilities, how they were to be trained and to work, and who would 
supervise them. If previously hiring the sons of employees allowed firms to count on 
a disciplined core workforce,21 the influx of immigrants from Germany’s rural reser-
voirs made this increasingly difficult. The sheer growth of German industry began 
to turn a surplus of labor into a deficit.22 In the two-and-a-half decades before World 
War I, unemployment averaged 2.6 percent.23 Even with the infusion of cheap, lar-
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gely Polish foreign labor, employers could no longer count on a virtually unlimited 
pool of inexpensive laborers. Economic good times and the resulting low levels of 
unemployment contributed to a much more rapid turnover of the workforce, espe-
cially among the unskilled, but also among trained workers looking to move up.24 
Such poaching between employers significantly raised the costs of worker training. 
The increased contacts between workers in different firms and regions could also 
add to employers’ political headaches, by paving the way for unionization.25 In light 
of both the economic problem of screening and retaining capable workers and the 
political one of keeping unions out, employers at their inaugural job-placement con-
ference in 1901 identified a “well-trained, reliable, and capable labor force that is as 
little subject to fluctuation as possible, as an absolute necessity of an industrial eco-
nomy.”26
The pressure to make better use of the workforce came not only from these 
domestic changes, but also from an increasingly competitive international envi-
ronment. If German manufacturers had in the meantime restored their reputation 
damaged by the devastating critiques of their shoddy work made at the 1876 World’s 
Fair, they now faced an array of competitors, especially from the US, in precisely the 
key areas of the ’second industrial revolution’: electronics, chemicals, and machine 
tools. In the 1890s and 1900s, the pressure from foreign competitors became consi-
derably fiercer. In particular, US firms such as General Electric and Westinghouse in 
the electrical industry, DuPont in chemicals, and a host of smaller firms in machine-
tools began to threaten German companies’ positions domestically and in world 
trade.27 While the German electrical giants Siemens and AEG, for example, had 
dominated world sales into the 1890s without serious challenge, by 1913, US com-
panies nearly had matched their output.28 American innovations in mass produc-
tion threatened German quality production with cheap prices (and sufficient qua-
lity). It also appeared to offer some German manufacturers an attractive model of 
their own future.
In the two decades before World War I, no consensus response to these chal-
lenges emerged. The 1897 reconstitution of craft guilds mobilized parts of manu-
facturing industry, but also divided it. The legal privileging of Handwerk led imme-
diately to demands for equal treatment of the growing number of workers trained 
by industry. However, the issue revealed divisions among industrialists about how 
equal access should be guaranteed, and even whether it mattered. A survey conduc-
ted for the industrial umbrella organization CVDI in 1913 produced
“very meager results (…) Industry generally, except for the engineering 
branch, where the question has already been thoroughly discussed, is still 
cool to the whole thing and is reluctant to commit itself by expressing a [pub-
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lic] opinion before having come to its own judgment (…) The majority of res-
pondents are of the view that there are enough apprentices in industry, and 
that these apprentices are well-trained.”29
Efforts to improve the training of industrial workers had to overcome more than 
mere apathy, however. A rival view of Germany’s industrial future  – a vision of 
rationalization drawing largely on US technology and principles – challenged the 
emphasis on skills. During the nineteenth century, US ingenuity and conditions – a 
vast middle class with unusually homogeneous consumer tastes, seemingly unlimi-
ted natural resources, a scarce supply of skilled labor, and the influx of millions of 
unskilled immigrants – helped to spawn an ‘American system’ of mass production.30 
Quickly trained workers used single-purpose machines to produce interchangeable 
parts that were then combined into cheap, standardized goods for a mass market. In 
the other rapidly industrializing power – Germany – manufacturers facing similar 
challenges of shortages of skilled workers and an abundance of the unskilled began 
employing US special machines in incipient mass consumer industries such as sew-
ing machines and bicycles.31 Even more resolutely, however, they embraced the spi-
rit of the US innovations. Enterprising German engineers, such as Georg Schlesin-
ger of the Ludwig Löwe machine-tool company, became the prophets of Frederick 
Winslow Taylor’s gospel of efficiency through centralized, systematic control. Ger-
man industrialists’ and engineers’ growing enthusiasm for ‘scientific management’ 
could lead easily to a denigration of the ‘human factor’ in production. On account 
of these clashing visions, as Gary Herrigel puts it, “there was tremendous ambiguity 
concerning the kind of production strategy producers seemed to be pursuing, even 
within individual firms.”32
Within industry, machine-producing and metal-working firms remained the 
most committed to a skilled workforce and stood at the forefront of efforts to insti-
tutionalize industrial training. By their very nature, these firms were closer to crafts: 
more dependent on individualized work and less capable of standardized mass pro-
duction. After 1900, the number of engineering companies maintaining their own 
training workshops and company schools for apprentices, though still only a small 
minority, also grew rapidly.33 By 1907, while Handwerk still trained the bulk of all 
apprentices, industry’s share had already risen to a third.34
More important in the long term than these steps by individual companies was 
the effort to create common standards for worker training, even in the absence of 
a legal framework. Perhaps because of the ambivalence even within firms, though, 
industrialists did not take the initiative. Rather, the Prussian Trade Ministry did. The 
Handelsministerium prodded the Association of German Engineers, the Machine-
Builders Association, and others in 1908 to establish the Deutsche Ausschuss für 
technische Schulung (DATSCH) – the German Committee on Technical Education.35 
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Though founded for the purpose of establishing and disseminating uniform norms 
for engineers’ education, DATSCH’s purview quickly expanded to include the entire 
vocational training system. Anton Rieppel and Fritz Frölich, directors of the large 
engineering firm MAN and longtime advocates of industry’s vocational training, 
were among the most forceful promoters of a broader mandate.36 By the fall of 1909, 
DATSCH had put apprenticeship training on its agenda.37 One of its main goals was 
to agree on clear vocational descriptions and uniform training methods for engi-
neering firms throughout Germany. The very first of DATSCH’s ‘guiding principles’ 
from 1912 expressed the nature and significance of what the Association now per-
ceived as its main task, as well its motivation:
“The mechanical industry is compelled to an ever greater degree, especially as 
a result of competition with foreign [industry], to perform high-value work. 
This requires constant progress in the education and training of young skilled 
workers. For this reason, it is one of the most important tasks of industry to 
ensure good training of a sufficient number of apprentices and to secure its 
due influence over the shaping of apprentice training. An orderly appren-
tice training also promotes the education of the worker as national citizen.”38 
This program to standardize industrial vocations and training schedules on a nati-
onal basis constituted, alongside the 1897 Handwerk Law’s policy of certifications, 
the other key piece to the German vocational system.39 However, the two pieces 
would only be combined and put into practice in the 1930s. For the time-being, the 
engineering firms organized in DATSCH remained marginal voices within indus-
try, their standardizing project more an aspiration than a reality. Likewise, the Prus-
sian Trade Ministry, which was unable to gain general assent from the Prussian lea-
dership for its position on the most effective youth policy, faced strong headwinds. 
Under these conditions, the burst of activity between 1907 and 1912 could only be 
limited to a ‘coalition of the willing’: self-organizing by some machine-tool and engi-
neering firms on the initiative of the Prussian Trade Ministry.
The Second Punctuation, 1925–1929: Industry’s ‘Reframing’ of Its Workers 
and the Creation of Standardized Berufe
Ten or fifteen years later, surprisingly, not much had changed. Germany had expe-
rienced four years of war and bitter defeat, of course, and the Kaiserreich had given 
way to the Weimar democracy. Yet in the early 1920s German government still did 
not pursue a unified policy on vocational training. Industry and Handwerk remai-
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ned at odds over control of training. And besides, German industry was as divided 
and ambivalent as ever about its skilled workers.
In politics, the conflict was no longer one within the Prussian administration, 
but between the newly emboldened and empowered SPD and unions, on the one 
hand, and the middle-class parties and employers on the other. Still, the outcome – 
the lack of a comprehensive public policy – was the same. Though both sides agreed 
that there should be national legislation regulating vocational training, they were at 
an impasse over whether unions should have a say in supervising training.
Many German industrialists were, if anything, even more enamored of mass pro-
duction and rationalization – the alternative to skilling – after the war than before. 
The mass production of war matériel, the use of unskilled women in war industries, 
and wartime and postwar interest in optimization had all contributed to a mania for 
‘Rationalisierung’ that continued into the early 1920s. 
Change came in the mid-1920s. It came this time not from the Prussian ministry 
but from within industry itself, and it came abruptly. In the years after 1924, German 
industrialists increasingly began to see their workers differently. Detailed studies of 
firms in the electrical and mechanical industries have revealed that a reevaluation 
of the skilled worker took place within companies in the mid-1920s.40 In June 1924, 
the National Productivity Board (RKW) devoted a session to the “training of young 
workers in the broadest sense,” one of the earliest public discussions of the issue. The 
first speaker, the head of the Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher 
Ingenieure), Conrad Matschoss, distinguished between the new US, ‘Fordist’ style of 
production and its German counterpart. The former trained its workers as quickly 
as possible for a particular, constantly repeated activity; the latter aimed to develop 
‘quality workers’.41 Another participant, Dr. E. Toussaint, a professor of engineering 
at the Berlin Technical University and industrial consultant, assailed the view that 
developments in the mechanical industry would eventually make the trained worker 
‘superfluous’. Anybody familiar with the issue, he insisted, would “long since” have 
recognized that the opposite would more likely be the case and that it would be only 
a matter of shifting trained and capable workers to new positions. “In many cases,” 
Toussaint concluded, “the most thorough exploitation of the machine could only be 
guaranteed if a thinking Facharbeiter used it.”42 As these comments suggested, many 
perceived the interest in the skilled worker to be a new, or at least newly urgent, phe-
nomenon. The director of the new Working Committee for Vocational Training (to 
be discussed below) put the matter in historical perspective:
“The fact that the vocational training of the workers is closely related to 
the productivity of the economy has been recognized for decades, if only at 
first from small circles, and practically useful work has been derived from 
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this knowledge. New is the sudden dissemination of these insights and the 
systematic way and energy with which these tasks are tackled, which have 
appeared so forcefully on the level of economic and social-political issues.”43
Why, though, did the turn to the Facharbeiter take place when it did, in the mid-
1920s, and why did it take the form it did, that is, as a relatively sudden paradigm shift 
and conversion? The scholarly inattention to these issues means that our answers 
can be only fairly speculative. The extension of wartime policies, the postwar infla-
tion, and, from late 1922, hyperinflation had temporarily permitted a remarkably 
smooth transition to peacetime production, but only by cloaking German industry’s 
true conditions in the haze of a depreciating currency, thereby giving their exporters 
a (constantly growing) advantage.44 In addition, the German demobilization policy, 
which prevented companies from releasing workers and perpetuated binding wage-
mediation procedures, had had significant effects on wage development, producti-
vity, technical innovation, and investment strategies. It thus further clouded emplo-
yers’ perceptions about future conditions.45 The necessarily painful adjustment, 
which in the other belligerent nations had occurred soon after the war’s end, took 
place in Germany only from 1924 on. At that point, a new currency and an agree-
ment on reparations restored monetary stability to the country, and demobilization 
restrictions were also removed.
With German companies having to sell their goods in a hard currency for the first 
time in years, competition in export markets stiffened considerably.46 German emplo-
yers had to take stock of their position in new domestic and international environ-
ments. By the mid-1920s, the unskilled worker had come to seem increasingly bur-
densome to German employers in several respects. Throughout the postwar period, 
but especially after the end of inflation, the untrained workforce had exhibited tur-
nover rates higher even than before 1914, in some regions and industries reaching 
annually well over 100 percent.47 Thanks to the massive influx of unskilled workers 
into unions and to the greater bargaining power of the latter, significant wage com-
pression occurred between unskilled and skilled laborers after the war. The relative 
rise in unskilled workers’ wages made investment in worker training all the more 
attractive.48 Based on their experiences in the war, industrialists had concluded that 
the unskilled worker was also far more likely than the skilled one to be politically 
radical and hence a potential source of disruption to the factory’s smooth operation. 
The alternative to a high-skilled workforce, then, seemed increasingly unattractive.
With near certainty, the most salient feature of the new international economic 
situation, the one to which both the German educated public and its employers paid 
the most attention in the middle years of the 1920s, was the spectacular growth 
of the US economy and its new forms of mass production.49 The stream of Ger-
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man industrialists who visited the stations of US success after 1924 returned to their 
own country with two basic lessons.50 German industry would have to adopt some 
important innovations from the US; however, for a number of reasons, Germany 
also would have to pursue its own kind of rationalization. Numerous references in 
the burgeoning discussion at this time about German ‘quality work’ suggest that the 
US system of production served as spur for the German industrialists to reconsider 
where their relative advantage lay.51 German industry would prosper or at least sur-
vive, not by competing with the US in the mass production of cheap goods, but in 
the more skilled manufacturing of higher-quality products.
German industry’s turn to the skilled worker, which occurred suddenly and with 
an apparent urgency, bears the marks not of a gradual accumulation of evidence and 
shifting of views, but rather of reframed thinking.52 Industrialists began to see their 
niche in the world economy and hence their workers differently: the worker changed 
from being a potential liability to the source and guarantor of German ‘quality work’.
This new view of the skilled worker not only stirred discussion of Germany’s 
comparative advantage in the global economy, it also spurred German industry to 
cooperate to put training on a firmer, standardized basis. Its initiatives took place 
against the backdrop first of delays in national legislation on vocational training, and 
then its postponement. By the middle of the decade, observers had serious doubts 
whether the laws ever would be enacted, although negotiations continued. Lea-
ding manufacturers, inspired by these new convictions regarding the importance of 
the skilled worker, decided to act regardless of the legislative outcome. One initia-
tive within industry, DINTA (Deutsches Institut für technische Arbeitsschulung), has 
been extensively studied for its conservative political thrust, but the more important 
projects of a revived DATSCH and its Working Committee on Vocational Training 
(Arbeitsauschuss für Berufsausbildung) have received hardly any attention. The crea-
tion of the Working Committee can be regarded as one of the decisive institutional 
steps in the creation of the modern German vocational training system. 
The Working Committee grew out of DATSCH’s earlier activities in worker trai-
ning. After the war-induced interruption of its activities, DATSCH picked up where 
it had left off, with the content of practical training of skilled workers. Borrowing 
materials from leading companies, the DATSCH staff developed course plans for 
such central vocations as machinist, constructive machinist, prototype-carpenter, 
and former. After a lull in the early 1920s, DATSCH’s sales to firms of these vocatio-
nal teaching materials nearly quadrupled between 1924 – when industrialists began 
to reevaluate their skilled workers  – and 1931, jumping from 40,000 to 150,000 
Reichsmark.53
DATSCH’s activities, especially after the war, focused on establishing standard 
training and work procedures for the most important industrial vocations. These in 
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turn prepared the ground for its founding in the summer of 1926 of the Working 
Committee, which nonetheless represented a true watershed in the creation of the 
German vocational system. The Working Committee went far beyond DATSCH’s 
earlier efforts in two significant ways, in regard to its supporters and to its mission. 
Unlike the pre–1914 DATSCH, the Working Committee had the backing of the Nati-
onal Association of German Industry and the Association of German Employers’ 
Organizations, the two most important industrial employer groups. When the lea-
ding handicrafts organizations joined the Working Committee in 1927, thus bury-
ing decades-old differences with industry over control of vocational training, all of 
the major employer groups were now engaged.54 Unlike the creation of DATSCH in 
1908, the founding of the Working Committee in 1926 did not depend on an initi-
ative from the government. Still, the Prussian Trade Ministry kept close tabs on the 
Arbeitsausschuss and acted as a go-between and trusted arbiter.55
In addition to the participation of the most important economic interest groups, 
the sense of mission and the comprehensive mandate of the Working Committee 
distinguished it more clearly from the earlier efforts of DATSCH. In the inaugural 
issue of the Working Committee’s journal, Technical Education (Technische Erzie-
hung), which became the flagship of the movement, the chairmen of the new body, 
the major industrialists Ernst von Borsig and Gottlieb Lippart, argued for the central 
role of the worker in the production process:
“In the widest circles it has gradually come to be recognized that the compe-
titiveness of our industry depends not only on the technical and organizati-
onal perfecting of the production apparatus, but to no lesser degree on the 
best-possible use of the available human forces. Everywhere one recognizes 
that the most valuable good possessed by Germany, robbed of so many natu-
ral resources, is human labor power.”
However, even more important was investing in the development of human capital:
“It is not enough, though, that one uses most economically the people who 
are integrated into the production process; rather, it is above all necessary 
that the abilities of those who are to participate in the production process are 
raised to the maximum and developed in the most versatile way even before 
they enter the economic system.”56 
The chairmen underscored the sweeping and systematic mandate of the Working 
Committee, “which will comprehensively treat all the great questions of the voca-
tional training of an industrial worker which are suited for a centralized regulation.” 
In an article entitled “Our Aims,” the director of the Working Committee, F. Schür-
holz, delineated more concretely the work ahead. The very first requirement, the 
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prerequisite for all further systematizing, was to ‘define’ all vocations. Only on the 
basis of such a clarification could the substantive coordination of training be under-
taken and vocational ‘profiles’ created that would describe (and prescribe) the rele-
vant activities of each job as well as the apprenticeship training necessary. Perhaps 
most crucially, the qualifying exams, “which influence the quality of the training and 
determine the extent of the demands made of the testee,” needed to be made largely 
uniform throughout the country.57 
Though Schürholz proposed the standardization of training and testing in the 
context of a commentary on the draft of a law on vocational training, it soon became 
clear that German industry’s goals in this regard did not depend ultimately on legal 
measures. When the proposed law finally foundered in 1928, the Working Commit-
tee and DATSCH continued, and even accelerated, their work.58 Over the following 
years, they turned out dozens of vocational profiles, training plans, and exams for 
the most important industrial vocations, in particular, those of the machine-tool 
and engineering industries, which had spearheaded industrial vocational training 
ever since the founding of DATSCH in 1908. 
The efforts from the mid-1920s by German industry and handicrafts, with the 
support of key government ministries, to systematize training procedures mark a 
decisive turning point in the formation of the overall German vocational system as 
it exists to this day. Through them, industry and handicrafts overcame their earlier 
animosity and cooperated to create standardized industrial vocations on a nation-
wide, not just regional, basis. They thus addressed some of the lacunae of the 1897 
Handwerk Law. But if the Working Committee’s standardizing began to deal with 
the informational problems plaguing industrial apprenticeships, it left unanswered 
questions of monitoring training and certifying results – which were of great rele-
vance to employers’ and apprentices’ incentives.
The Third Punctuation, 1934–1939: Nazi Politics and the Completion of 
the German Vocational System
Nearly a decade later, in the mid-1930s, even the traumatic experience of the Great 
Depression had not altered German industry’s basic commitment to building a 
high-skills workforce. What had changed, most crucially, was the political climate. 
The new, totalitarian regime facilitated the completion of the vocational system 
through both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. As part of the Nazis’ efforts 
to ‘coordinate’ the economy, the regime compelled industrial groups to merge into 
the Organization of the Producing Economy (Organisation der gewerblichen Wirt-
schaft), which the Economics Ministry recognized as the official representation 
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of industry’s interests.59 As contradictory as the judgments in the scholarly litera-
ture are about the overall effects of this merger and affiliation with the Ministry 
of Economics,60 in the realm of vocational training, as we shall see, industry acted 
with even greater unity than before. As for the Nazis’ intentions for the economy, 
they regarded the economy primarily as a means to the end of preparing Germany 
for war. Purely domestic goals – whether creating a consumer society or fostering 
upward mobility through training – were secondary and possibly mutually contra-
dictory. Given Germany’s limited resources, the Nazis tended to look favorably on 
efforts to improve the quality of the country’s workforce in order to ready the coun-
try for war. Of even greater importance than the regime’s pressure to conform and 
to give the workers skills, however, were the effects of its divisive elements. Various 
party agencies, above all the hyper-active Robert Ley’s Labor Front, acted on their 
own to obtain influence over worker training. These encroachments spurred indus-
trialists and officials in the Economics and Labor Ministries and Labor Administra-
tion to circle the wagons and cooperate even more closely.61 In response to the Labor 
Front’s continuing meddling in the field of vocational training, Economics Minister 
Schacht in September 1935 cemented the already close relationship between indus-
try and the Economics and Labor Ministries. Citing “the significance of the techni-
cal-economic training for the economy,” Schacht, in conjunction with the Minister 
of Education, gave DATSCH official status as his advisory body.62 In 1938, DATSCH 
was given an even more secure position when it was re-baptized as the Reich Insti-
tute for Vocational Training.
Under these circumstances, employers’ associations led the way in reviving and 
extending the project of the previous decade to create a standardized vocational 
training system. In the spring of 1934, as the first signs of an economic turnaround 
manifested themselves, the president of the Reich Estate of Industry had made 
known his organization’s conviction that “today more than ever quality-work” – and 
hence the training of apprentices – was of signal importance for the long-term reco-
very of German industry.63 In November of the same year, a DATSCH committee on 
vocational counseling gathered in November 1934 for its inaugural meeting.64 In a 
sign of the increasingly close links between industry and the government ministries, 
Johannes Handrick, the national head of vocational counseling in the Labor Admi-
nistration, chaired the industrialists’ committee. The committee quickly focused on 
‘clearly distinguished vocational profiles’. Resuming the work of the Working Com-
mittee and DATSCH from nearly a decade earlier, the committee decided, was now 
‘an urgent task’. Work on vocational profiles as the pivot of a coordinated system of 
vocational training and counseling took center stage. A lead article in the February 
1935 Technical Education on “The Vocational Profile” posited that “[t]he significance 
which the most complete possible inclusion of all vocational activities in the form 
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of vocational profiles has for the planned training of apprentices and hence for the 
entire economic praxis – this cannot be overstated.” The profiles would provide the 
most basic guidance for the apprenticeship training. Of far greater importance, how-
ever, than their significance in directly improving the quality of individual training, 
according to the article, which echoed the arguments made in the mid-1920s, was 
their role in overcoming the informational and coordination problems undermining 
collective action. For the standardization of the profiles and also of the training and 
the exams based on them would permit the smooth flow of labor around the coun-
try. Only with such guarantees of standard quality could every apprentice be certain 
that he might be hired by other employers, in other regions. And only then could 
employers be confident in hiring someone trained elsewhere.65
Not only did it solve the information problem, but the cooperation itself also 
strengthened the employers’ organizations, such as the Chambers of Trade and 
Commerce, and the mutual expectations that made firms’ compliance more likely. 
Even as several Nazi laws restricted the freedom of workers to move from job to job 
and region to region, industry and the Labor Administration were cooperating to 
create a system of mobile skilled labor.
In its work on vocational profiles, DATSCH began where the Working Commit-
tee had in the mid-1920s, with the centrally important skilled metalworking posi-
tions. Drawing on the latter’s work, it concentrated initially on skilled vocations, 
all of which required a three- to four-year apprenticeship. Only later in the decade 
would it take on the trickier task of standardizing the “several thousand” semi-
skilled positions that spanned a much greater range of training schedules. By the 
spring of 1935, DATSCH could publish its first 10 profiles.66 These limited themsel-
ves to describing the ‘task area’ and both the necessary and the desired ‘capabilities‘ 
of the workers.
In the course of the same year, DATSCH committees began to engage in a flurry 
of activity, extending the work on standardization to the other aspects of vocational 
training. That encompassed practical training in the firm, courses in the vocational 
school, and the completion exams.67 Important issues – such as the exact relation of 
the ‘basic vocations’ of training to the more specific positions in the economy and 
the proliferation and nature of training for semi-skilled vocations – remained sub-
ject to lively debate. Nonetheless, the participants regarded their work as an ‘evol-
ving enterprise’ and carried on. By early 1936, DATSCH had published two-dozen 
profiles of the most important ‘basic vocations’.68 
An historic agreement within industry lent all of this standardizing work imme-
diate practical relevance. In July 1935, the Reich Group Industry and the Association 
of Chambers of Industry and Trade agreed to establish for the first time industry’s 
own formal vocational certification system, independent of that of handicrafts, which 
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since the 1897 revision of the Commercial Code had had a monopoly on certifica-
tions.69 The vocational profiles, training plans, and completion exams being develo-
ped at the time were to be incorporated formally into the ‘apprenticeship contract’ 
between the firm and the trainee. This step by industry, taken with the approval of 
the Economics and Labor Ministries and in expectation of a future legal regulation of 
the matter, began to draw to a close the long-running dispute between industry and 
handicrafts over the latter’s monopoly over accreditation, a dispute which, as we have 
seen, had not prevented the two sides from cooperating in the late 1920s on the Wor-
king Committee. A 1938 decree of the Reich Education Minister would finally put the 
industrial completion exams on the same legal footing as Handwerk’s.70 
Within several years in the mid-1930s, the industrial training system had acqui-
red not only standardized content, but also full-fledged formal accreditation. Close 
monitoring by local Chambers of Industry and Trade prevented serious free-riding 
and ensured that firms in fact took on their fair share of apprentices. A decade after 
German industry had become fully conscious of the potential value of the skilled 
worker and had initiated a project to standardize training, a second round of these 
efforts in the mid-1930s, including now means for monitoring and certifying trai-
ning, effectively had launched the ‘German skills machine’.
In the years 1934/35, industry not only made crucial advances in reviving and 
extending its project of standardizing vocational training system, but it also began 
offering an increasing number of apprenticeships, not least thanks to the concurrent 
organizational work. The rise in the number of open positions employers registe-
red with the labor offices from its nadir in the years 1931/32 and 1932/33 no doubt 
reflected a number of factors. The general improvement in economic conditions 
from 1933 onward made employers more willing to offer apprenticeships. Yet the 
rapid increase from fewer than 130,000 positions in 1932/33 to 219,000 the next year 
and nearly 300,000 in 1934/35, when unemployment still hovered well above 10 per-
cent, surpassed the number of apprenticeships offered in the best years of the Wei-
mar recovery (255,000 in 1927/28) and cannot be attributed to the general econo-
mic climate alone.71
Even more important than the improved atmosphere between the two sides, 
however, the creation of common standards of vocational training and of a certifi-
cation system altered companies’ willingness to train workers as a result. In an essay 
in Technical Education in July 1936, a leading representative of the Reich Group 
Industry emphasized the decisive role of the organizational work: “[F]or industry 
until now clear legal bases for an impeccable training and education of the industrial 
youth have been lacking. A responsible attitude on the part of many industrial firms 
has always existed […] But today for the first time the conditions have been created 
which allow German industry to solve these tasks on its own.”72 The response of Ger-
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man industry would be so strong, in fact, that by 1939, it would offer more apprenti-
ceships (583,000) for young men than there were job-seekers (555,000).73
Conclusion
The 1897 Handwerk Law offered a partial solution to the problems of vocational trai-
ning in a liberalized economic order. Its system of certification overcame the infor-
mational and incentives problems facing both employers and apprentices. Howe-
ver, the 1897 legislation was only a limited success in that it established regional, not 
national, standards and, even more importantly in that it left out the most important 
and dynamic part of the economy, industry. Subsequently, three periods of intense 
activity built on and extended the 1897 model, creating by the late 1930s the modern 
German vocational system.
After 1907, the Prussian Trade Ministry encouraged those parts of industry that 
were already committed to a high-skills workforce, above all, the engineering and 
machine-tools firms, to cooperate and agree on national standards. The 1907 census, 
which showed a growing proportion of unskilled workers, and the rising worries 
about ‘youth’, especially in the face of the Social Democrats’ seemingly unstoppable 
growth, prompted the Trade Ministry’s action. Divisions with the Prussian govern-
ment as well as within German industry limited the former to this targeted encou-
ragement.
In the mid-1920s, German industrialists’ encounter with the awesome American 
mass-production economy convinced them that they needed to focus on higher-
quality, niche markets. This urgent reorientation prompted many German emplo-
yers to think of – almost to see – their workers differently: a Facharbeiter, a skilled 
worker, could be a great asset. With a bill on vocational training thwarted by poli-
tical fighting, all the major industry groups launched a project to standardize voca-
tions and the training for them on a nationwide basis. They thus began to realize 
what the Prussian Trade Ministry and engineering firms organized in DATSCH had 
aspired to twenty years earlier. In this work, German industry had the support of the 
Prussian Trade Ministry and was soon joined by Handwerk.
Nearly a decade later, the political atmosphere of the Third Reich conduced to 
put all the pieces together. Industry again took the initiative and together with key 
government ministries produced dozens more standardized vocations and training 
regimens. By 1938, industry had also established the legal and institutional means to 
monitor training and award accreditation for both industrial and handicraft voca-
tions. Over the next decades millions of young Germans would stream into skilled 
work.
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